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*File
NIE 35/1
gaps*

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The attached papers were prepared by representatives of the IAC agencies following the production of NIE-35/1, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1952," published 3 March 1952.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the IAC note TAB "A", "Report of IAC Representatives' Post-Mortem Meeting on NIE-35/1," and authorize and direct the Secretary to explore with appropriate IAC agency representatives the measures suggested for improving US intelligence on Indochina.
2. That the IAC note TAB "B", "IAC List of Intelligence Gaps Revealed in the Preparation of NIE-35/1," and that each member agree to take action within his sphere of responsibility designed to close the gaps indicated.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary

*NOT HANDLED THIS
WAY BECAUSE OF
WRANGLE OVER
PROCEDURE TO
BE FOLLOWED.*

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25 March 1952

MEMO FOR :
VIA : Mr. Bundy *WFB.*
FROM : and C. Cooper
SUBJECT : Submission to IAC of Post-Mortem on NIE-35/1

ATTACHMENTS:

- A. Report of IAC Representatives Post-Mortem Meeting on NIE-35/1, and Suggested Methods of Improving US Intelligence on Indochina
- B. Revised List of Intelligence Gaps on Indochina Revealed in the Preparation of NIE-35/1
- C. Detailed Minutes of Post-Mortem Meeting

1. We suggest that Attachments "A" and "B", together with an explanatory memorandum, be placed before the IAC for their study and action. Attachment "A" is a summary of the discussion and recommendations of the IAC Representatives' Post-Mortem meeting of 19 March 1952. Attachment "B" is a new list of intelligence gaps, revised in accordance with the sense of the above meeting.

2. It should be noted that in dealing with procedural aspects of intelligence collecting Attachments "A" and "B" go somewhat beyond the scope of this Office. We feel, however, that these attachments may be of assistance in improving US intelligence on Indochina.

3. Attachment "C" is the detailed minutes of the post-mortem meeting. We do not intend to circulate this document, but feel it will be of value to keep on file in O/NE. If it is felt that detailed minutes are worthwhile, it would be helpful if a stenographer were present at future post-mortem meetings.

has this been cleared?

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4. You may wish to explain, in a covering memorandum to the IAC, that this is the pilot model of post mortems.

5. We suggest, finally, that Attachments "A" and "B" be distributed both to the IAC and to the IAC representatives, and that the IAC representatives be informed that detailed minutes of the post-mortem meeting are on file in O/NE.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF IAC REPRESENTATIVES' POST-MORTEM MEETING ON NIE-35/1

A. Summary of Post-Mortem Discussion on NIE-35/1

1. In general, National Estimates would benefit from better coordination between the field and Washington, and within the field itself.

a. An inter-agency ad hoc evaluative body of US officials has been established in Indochina. This group should in time improve interchange of intelligence within the field.

b. National Estimates would profit from an established system of cabling the field for its capsuled conclusions concerning the principal questions of an Estimate.

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3. National Estimates suffer from insufficient intelligence concerning Viet Minh and Chinese Communist developments. (See TAB "B")

B. Suggested Measures which Might Improve US Intelligence on Indochina

NOTE: These suggestions were raised by individual IAC representatives. They are intended as a guide for the office of OIC/CIA, which, where so directed by the IAC, would then discuss these suggestions with appropriate IAC agency representatives in an effort to determine the feasibility of each agency taking such action as it can to improve intelligence procedures. These suggestions are not listed in any order of priority.

1. Improved guidance to the field.
2. The establishing of a system of cabled comments from the field on the principal questions of a National Estimate.
3. The improving of interchange of intelligence within the field.


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7. The establishing of improved systems of reporting on south China developments from the adjacent peripheral areas of Southeast Asia.

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TAB "B"

IAC LIST OF INTELLIGENCE WEAKNESSES REVEALED
IN THE PREPARATION OF NIE-35/1

NOTE: The following list of intelligence weaknesses is not in any way intended to constitute intelligence requirements; rather, the following items constitute areas where individual IAC representatives feel that NIE-35/1 suffered from lack of adequate intelligence. This list is intended as a guide for the office of OIC/CIA, which, if so directed by the IAC, would then discuss these intelligence weaknesses with appropriate IAC agency representatives in an effort to determine the feasibility of each agency taking such action as it can within its sphere of responsibility to close the gaps indicated. No priority of intelligence weaknesses was agreed upon at the IAC representatives post-mortem; the following priority is that suggested by ONE/CIA.

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Approved For Release 2005/06/23 : CIA-RDP79R00971A000500020017-2

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